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ABSTRACT 
In this paper I analyze the monetary theories underlying the arguments that 
Locke and Lowndes directed against each other during their discussions around the 
Great Recoinage of 1696. My primary place of interest is the theory that Marx calls “the 
theory of the nominal standard of money”, which is the theory that the monetary names 
stand for definite quantities of value, so that the unit of money is a unit of value. I argue 
that Lowndes appealed to this theory and that the criticism of it offered by Locke is 
fundamentally correct, in spite of which Lowndes’ language and ideas can be very often 
found in current discussions about monetary problems. In the course of this theoretical 
investigation, I have come across the critical commentaries of Steuart and Marx, which 
are not paid the attention they deserve in the standard literature. Marx commentary is of 
special interest because it contains a solid theoretical explanation of the concepts 
appealed to in the debate and puts it in a very interesting practical perspective. 
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By 1696, the English silver currency had lost much of its metal content, 
because of the combined effect of intensive usage and clipping. Although this fact was 
widely known, the role played by those coins in payments was so prominent that they 
remained in circulation. The loss of silver of the coins and the uncertainty about the 
actual content of each particular coin gave rise, as can be logically expected, to 
abundant and continuous litigations. In 1696, and after a long debate, the English 
Treasury finally acted to restore monetary order and proceeded to recoin the English 
stock of silver, in what is known as the Great Recoinage of 1696. A central question in 
the debates was the mint-parity at which the recoinage was to be carried out. The price 
of silver bullion at London had been consistently above the official mint-parity for 
years, and this fact could not be ignored. There were, basically, two answers to this 
central question: first, to set the current market price of silver at London as the new 
mint-parity; secondly, to keep the current official mint-parity unchanged, regardless the 
continued excess of the market price of silver over the mint-parity. 
The main advocate of the first proposal, which thus involved a debasement of 
the silver coins in accordance to the high price of bullion, was Lowndes. His plan of 
monetary reform was to recoin all the silver in England according to the high price of 
silver bullion that had prevailed at London for years. In practical terms, Lowndes’ plan 
was to diminish the silver content of all English coins by 20%. His plan of recoinage 
was intrinsically associated, therefore, to a proposal of debasement according to the 
market price of silver bullion. Lowndes held that such a recoinage plus debasement 
would not hurt the interest of anyone, because everybody would get the same money as 
before the recoinage, even though, truly, everybody would get 20% less silver than 
before. After all, as experience had amply shown, the ability of coins to discharge debts 
depends on its face value, not on its metal content. 
Locke was the main advocate of the second plan of monetary reform, which 
consisted in recoining the English stock of silver according to the old official mint-
parity. Locke, thus, disputed not the desirability of a recoinage, but the desirability of 
the debasement that Lowndes was putting forwards. Locke replied to Lowndes that any 
debasement involves a fraud to the landlords and money lenders; also, of course, the 
debasement according to the higher market price of silver bullion. According to Locke, less silver necessarily implies less money; in consequence, he opposed the thesis of 
Lowndes’ that the debasement would not have any re-distributive consequences and 
held that it certainly would. 
In the end, Locke prevailed over Lowndes and, in the Great Recoinage of 
1696, the English stock of silver was recoined according to the old official mint-parity 
rather than at the higher price of silver bullion that had prevailed at London during the 
war. This paper concentrates on the theoretical issues at stake. The political and 
institutional context of the debate has received an excellent treatment by Desmedt 
(Desmedt, 2007a) which also contains a lot of highly valuable financial information. 
Having said that, let us start the theoretical examination on the debate by the ideas of 
Lowndes. 
1. Lowndes’ Proposal of Monetary Reform 
The proposal of Lowndes in this document is to recoin all the English silver at 
a mint-parity 1/5 higher that the official mint-parity current before 1695, which amounts 
to diminishing the silver content of English coins by 20% at the same time that the 
names of the silver coins are kept unchanged. Lowndes advocated this debasement on 
the basis that the market price of silver bullion at London was consistently 20% higher 
than the official mint-parity of silver coins. This shows, said Lowndes, that the value of 
silver has risen. Lowndes, thus, attributed the excess of the market price of bullion over 
the mint-parity to the rise in the value of silver.  
What evil could be derived from the acknowledgement of the fact that now an 
ounce of silver is worth five instead of four shillings? asks Lowndes. The continued 
high price of silver bullion in the free market shows, according to Lowndes, that the 
value of silver in England has risen. That the shilling or nominal price of the silver 
bullion has risen by 20% means that the amount of silver required to purchase a shilling 
has fallen by 20%. That less silver is required to purchase an English shilling means that 
the value of silver in relation to the English shilling has risen. The market is showing 
that the value of the silver contained in the English silver coins has risen by 20%. If we 
want a stable measure of value, the action that logic requires is to reduce by 20% the 
silver content of the coins. If the silver content of the silver coins is reduced by the same proportion as that by which the value of the silver with which they are made rises, we 
have a constant unit of value and, therefore, a currency in good order. 
For Lowndes, the diminution of the amount of silver contained in the coins 
does not alter in the least the purchasing power of those coins, because the ability of the 
coins to redeem debts depends only on the mark stamped upon them, that is, on the 
name they bear. A crown is always a crown, and a shilling is always a shilling, 
regardless of the amount of silver contained in the crown coins. As long as one receives 
the same amount of shillings, or of crown coins, one is receiving the same money. This 
means that the landlords will not be defrauded of any wealth because they will receive 
as rent the same number of coins or of shillings after and before the debasement; that is 
to say, they will receive the same amount of money as before the debasement because 
they will receive the same amount of shillings. It is true that the landlords will not 
receive the same amount of silver as before the debasement, but they will receive the 
same amount of money, which is what the debate is all about, and this is true because 
the name of the money they receive stays the same. Silver can rise or fall in value, that 
is, in value in terms of shillings; the fact in 1695 is that it has risen. Accordingly, 
everything costs less silver, which means that the loss in content of the coins implied by 
the debasement is exactly compensated by the rise in the lower amount of silver they 
contain. As a consequence of these two offsetting effects, the landlords and the creditors 
will receive the same value and, therefore, the same money in payment. The debasement 
of the silver currency in accordance with the high price of silver does not have any 
redistributive effect and does not defraud anybody of his wealth. 
One could even take one step further and contend that, if the silver coins are 
not debased when silver rises in value, there is a hidden unjust premium for the 
landlords and creditors, as they get more money than that owed to them. Without a 
debasement in accordance with the high price of silver, the landlords and the creditors 
would get the same amount of silver, but, as the value of that silver has risen and the 
content of the coins has not been reduced by the same proportion, they get value in 
excess of the value owed to them, which means that they get money in excess of the 
money owed to them. I have not seen this objection raised by any of the two parties of 
this debate, but it logically follows from the arguments presented in the discussion. Lowndes insists that the only purpose of the debasement he proposes is to 
acknowledge the fact that the value of silver in England has risen. This means that he 
would accept that there would be room for accusations of fraud if the plan contemplated 
a recoinage according to a new mint-parity different from the current market price of 
silver, but this is not the case. The continuous excess of the price of silver bullion over 
the official mint-parity shows that silver has risen in value. The purpose of the plan is to 
keep constant the quantity of value named by the English monetary names. Lowndes is 
therefore saying quite clearly that the monetary names are names of quantities of value, 
and not of quantities of silver. 
The debasement of the English currency does not modify the amount of money 
received by anyone because it does not change the nominal price of anything. Silver 
rises in value against the commodities, but also against the monetary names, which 
means that, as less silver is needed to purchase everything, nominal and relative prices 
remain the same with a debasement according to the high price of silver. Everybody 
goes on paying the same money for the same things if the silver content is reduced 
according to the rise in the value of silver. If a loaf of bread costs one shilling, one 
shilling will always buy a loaf of bread, because the amount of silver that purchases the 
shilling itself falls by the same proportion. Why keep heavy shillings in circulation 
when debts can be discharged with light shillings owing to the rise in the value of 
silver? would ask Lowndes. Those who own the few heavy shillings that might continue 
in existence will certainly find it to their advantage to melt them and recoin them into 
more shillings. This is true, but represents no injustice, as it is a simple reflection of the 
fact that the value of silver has risen. 
Lowndes is saying that “shilling” is the name of a definite quantity of value; 
say, of the value of a loaf of bread or of a pint of milk. The amount of silver that the 
shilling coin may contain does not affect the meaning of the monetary name “shilling”. 
A shilling will always be a shilling, no matter what its metallic content might be. 
The rise in the value of silver is but the other side of the coin of a 
corresponding fall in the value of the shilling. Before the debasement, it was necessary 
to give out ¼ of an ounce of silver in exchange for a shilling; now, after the 
debasement, only 1/5 of an ounce of silver purchases a shilling. The rise in the value of silver implies, accordingly, an equi-proportional fall in the value of the shilling against 
silver, not any rise in the shilling prices of commodities, but only in their silver prices. 
One could say that, for Lowndes, the main effect of a debasement in 
accordance with the market price of silver would be a more efficient use of the English 
stock of silver, as the same amount of silver will perform more payments than before. In 
this sense, the debasement will enhance the supply of English money. This is important 
because Lowndes held that this supply was insufficient. For Lowndes, the high price of 
bullion shows that the value of silver in England and, therefore, the money contained in 
the English stock of silver had grown beyond the quantity established by legal 
conventions; first of all, by the legal mint-parity. Why cut the supply of money, of silver 
coins, at a time when the market shows that silver contains more value? The 
debasement of the English silver coins according to the market price of silver bullion 
would multiply the English money supply, but, as the quantity of money would rise by 
the same proportion in everybody’s hands, monetary relations, which basically means 
relative prices, would stay the same. Everybody would continue to get the same number 
of cons of the same denomination as before the debasement and, therefore, the same 
money. The only change, which is irrelevant for the value of money, is that the silver 
content of each English silver coin will be lower than before. 
Lowndes could be read as claiming that the refusal to debase the English silver 
coins in accordance with the high market price of silver was a waste of silver, an 
inefficient monetary arrangement that failed to make the most of the silver existing in 
England, an unfounded restriction of the supply of English money. The refusal to 
debase the English silver coins according to the high market price of silver bullion 
involves a refusal to expand the supply of money that just makes payments more 
difficult and more expensive than they should be otherwise. Because of the enhanced 
value of silver, there is more money in each silver coin when the value of silver rises 
(that is, when the market price of silver bullion rises above the official mint-parity). The 
rise in the value of silver logically calls for the reduction of the amount of silver that 
serves as standard of price, so as to keep constant the value that serves as standard of 
price. This means that, for Lowndes, the standard or unit of price is a unit of value; this 
is the theory that Marx labels “theory of the nominal standard of money”. We can see 
that Lowndes accepted this theory. 2. Locke’s Refutation of Lowndes 
Locke agreed with Lowndes on the necessity of recoining the English stock of 
silver in order to restore monetary stability, but frontally disagreed with on the matter of 
the 20% debasement of the silver coins. Locke held against Lowndes that the excess of 
the market price of silver over the official mint-parity was not the consequence of 
anything like a “rise in the value of silver”, but simply the measure of the common 
estimation of the average loss of silver of the English coins. There was, therefore, no 
need to debase the coins because of any revaluation of silver and, if such debasement 
were carried out, it would provoke a re-distribution of wealth, as against Lowndes. 
For Locke, the excess of the market price of silver over the mint-parity, even if 
persistent, does not justify a debasement and, in particular, does not justify a 
debasement in accordance with the high price of bullion. The main effect of such a 
debasement would b e distributional and Locke wants to make clear that no debasement 
is neutral for the distribution of wealth. In particular, the debasement proposed by 
Lowndes involved a fraud to the class of landlords and to the class of money lenders. 
These classes would be defrauded of 20% of their wealth as a consequence of the 
reduction of the silver content of the coins by 20%, because, in receiving 20% less 
silver they would receive 20% less money. The recoinage proposed by Lowndes 
involved, thus, a 20% diminution in the wealth of landlords and money lenders. This 
loss had its counterpart in an equivalent gain for those who, at the time of the 
debasement, happened to possess unworn coins. Though it is true that the English silver 
should be recoined because of the bad state of the English coins, it is no less true that 
English silver should be recoined according to the old mint-parity, not according to the 
market price of silver bullion. Otherwise, the recoinage would involve an unjust 
redistribution of wealth. 
In order to argue that the excess of the market price of silver does not call for 
any equivalent debasement of the silver coins, Locke directs his attacks against the 
theoretical foundations of Lowndes’ apology of this plan. Basically, Locke argues that 
the explanation of the excess of the market price of silver over the mint-parity as the 
consequence of a rise in the value of silver (in the value of the standard of price) is 
nonsensical. Accordingly, Locke states against Lowndes that the monetary names are not names of definite quantities of value, but of definite quantities of a particular 
commodity, such as, in the case at hand, silver. 
“Mr. Lowndes proposes, that our Money should be raised (as it is called) one fifth: that is, That 
all our present denominations of Money, as Penny, Shilling, Half-crown, Crown, &c. should each have 
One fifth less Silver in it, or be answered with Coin of One fifth less value.” (Locke, 1691) 
However: 
“If all the Species of Money, be, as 'tis call'd raised by making each of them to have One 
twentieth less of Silver in them than formerly; and so your whole Money be lighter than it was: These 
following will be some of the consequences of it. 
1. It will rob all Creditors of One twentieth (or 5 per Cent.) of their Debts, and all Landlords 
One twentieth of their quit Rents for ever; and in all other Rents as far as their former Contracts reach, of 
5 per Cent. of their yearly Income; and this without any advantage to the Debtor, or Farmer.” (Locke, 
1691) 
The debtors do not gain what the creditors lose, says Locke. Steuart will 
afterwards reject this thesis of Locke, as we shall presently see. The creditors lose 5% 
because they are given 5% less silver and this implies, for Locke, that they receive 5% 
less money. Why do not the debtors gain this 5% according to Locke? Who gets it? Let 
me note how Locke takes it for granted that a debasement implies a zero-sum game, in 
which the loss of one party must be the gain of another. Let us return to the question: 
who gains what the creditors and landlords lose? The answer turns out to rest on the 
answer to the question as to whether or not the general price level will rise by 5%. If 
prices stay the same after the debasement, the debtor receives the same amount of coins 
as before, but 5% less silver. As nominal magnitudes are concerned, the position of the 
money lender or the landlord, without inflation, remains unaltered; as real magnitudes 
are concerned, he receives less silver. The question is whether “less silver” implies “less 
money”. 
If the general price level rose by 5% after the debasement and the farmer sold 
his produce at a price 5% higher, he would receive 5% more coins, but, as these coins 
are 5% lighter, he would get the same silver as before. “In nomine” he gets 5% more but 
“in re” he gets the same silver as before. As all nominal prices have moved up in the 
same direction and proportion of 5%, relative nominal prices remain unchanged, and the debasement has not altered relative prices –therefore, the interest of the farmer, “in re”, 
remains unchanged. Who then gains what the creditors lose? 
“For Money having been Lent, and Leases and other Bargains made, when Money was of the 
same Weight and Fineness that it is now, upon Confidence that under the same names of Pounds, 
Shillings and Pence, they should receive the same value, (i.e. the same quantity of Silver) by giving the 
denomination now to less quantities of Silver by One twentieth, you take from them 5 per Cent. of their 
due.” (Locke, 1691) 
Locke ties here “money” to “value”: there is the same quantity of money where 
there is the same value. But this is precisely the fundamental error that he denounces in 
Lowndes! Indeed, as we shall see in the course of this paper, Locke did not coherently 
stick to the thesis that he so much stresses against Lowndes that the monetary names are 
names of determinate quantities of a particular commodity and not of determinate 
quantities of value. The standard literature does not note this internal inconsistency in 
the writings of Locke. In my opinion, Locke strikes the right note when he states this 
thesis against Lowndes, a thesis on the value of money that Lowndes never held. The 
reply of Locke to Lowndes could be summed up saying that two ounces of silver will 
always represent double the value of one ounce of silver, regardless of the marks 
stamped upon the ounces of silver might be. There are abundant passages where Locke 
explicitly holds this view; for instance, in his “Further Considerations” he notes: 
“Silver is the Measure of Commerce by its quantity, which is the Measure also of its intrinsick 
value. If one grain of Silver has an intrinsick value in it, two grains of Silver have double that intinsick 
value, and three grains treble, and so on proportionably.” (Locke, 1697) 
Accordingly: 
“When Men go to Market to buy any other Commodities with their new, but lighter Money, 
they will find 20 s. of their new Money will buy no more of any Commodity than 19 would before. For it 
not being the denomination but the quantity of Silver, that gives the value to any Coin, 19 Grains or parts 
of Silver, however denominated or marked, will no more be worth, or pass for, or buy so much of any 
other Commodity as 20 Grains of Silver will, than 19 s. will pass for 20 s.” (Locke, 1691) 
This means that the general price level will rise by 5% if the silver content of 
the silver coins is reduced by 5%. If the farmer (who, here, plays the role of debtor) 
goes on receiving in payment for his corn the same amount of coins as before, he is 
losing 5% in silver and, therefore, in money, says Locke, which means that he joins his creditor on the losers’ side of the economy, as the creditor gets 5% less silver when he 
receives the same amount of coins after the debasement and, therefore, 5% less money. 
In more modern words, the debasement expropriates the banker and the capitalist of 5% 
of their “wealth”. However, we do not know yet who gets this wealth. 
“For 'tis Silver and not Names that pay Debts and purchase Commodities.” (Locke, 1691) 
This is a straight-forward rejection of the theory of the nominal standard of 
money. By the way, this carries the implication that no money is created by reducing the 
metallic content of the coins. 
For the sake of clarity, I would like to explicitly note that the relation between 
a monetary name and its definition is not a value relation. Lowndes views the silver 
coins as an imperfect form of inconvertible paper money, the ability of which to 
discharge debts depends on what is written rather than on the value of the stuff upon 
which the written is written. On that account, the actual metallic content of the silver 
coins is irrelevant for the determination of their purchasing power, and paper is a more 
developed incarnation of the same idea of supplanting the precious metals in circulation 
in order to reduce “transaction costs”. At the same time, it is to be stressed that the 
relation between the monetary names and silver is not one of value, but of convention. 
When the mint-parity is changed, no value is changed thereby; the only thing changed is 
the standard of price, but in no way the value of anything; in particular, not the value of 
the standard of price. The determination of a mint-parity is not any determination of 
value whatsoever; accordingly, a change in mint-parity does not involve any change in 
the value of anything, nor is it needed to reflect the change in the value of anything; it 
just represents a change in the quantity of the particular commodity that serves as 
standard of price. Locke makes an interesting comment in the course of his refutation of 
Lowndes’ plan of this point. 
“His fifth Head p. 74. [KO: Locke refers to the text of Lowndes’ proposal] is to answer those, 
who hold, that by the lessening our Money one fifth, all People who are to receive Money upon Contracts 
already made, will be defrauded of 20 per Cent. of their due: And thus all Men will lose one fifth of their 
settled Revenues, and all men that have lent Money one fifth of their Principal and Use. To remove this 
Objection, Mr. Lowndes says, that Silver in England is grown scarce, and consequently dearer, and so is 
of higher price.” (Locke, 1697) Silver has risen in value in England because it has become scarcer, says 
Lowndes. This is why the market price of bullion consistently remains over the mint-
parity. The revaluation of silver implies that landlords and creditors will receive the 
same real amount of money after the debasement when they receive an unchanged 
amount of coins. They will receive the same real amount of money because they will 
receive the same nominal amount of money, and money circulates according to its name, 
not according to its metal content. The landlords and money lenders get the same money 
because they get the same value, even though it is true that they get less silver. The 
lower silver content of the new lighter coins is exactly offset by the increased value of 
silver. The landlords and money lenders receive the same value and, therefore, the same 
money  under his plan, says Lowndes. Here is Locke’s reply to this argument of 
Lowndes’: 
“Let us grant for the present, that [silver] is of higher price (which how he makes out I shall 
examine by and by.) This, if it were so, ought not to annul any Man's Bargain, nor make him receive less 
in quantity than he lent. He was to receive again the same Summ, and the Publick Authority was 
Guarantee that the same Summ should have the same quantity of Silver under the same Denomination. 
And the reason is plain, why in justice he ought to have the same quantity of Silver again, 
notwithstanding any pretended rise of its value.” (Locke, 1697) 
The contract was made for silver, not for value, replies Locke to Lowndes. One 
cannot give nor take value, but something that has value; in England, silver. Money is 
silver, and the unit of money is a particular amount of silver set by convention. The 
monetary names name determinate quantities of silver, not of value. Value as such 
cannot be counted; nothing is value as such, but something that has value. That 
something that has value. This means that the purest expression of value we can aim at 
is money, but money still is and will always be a particular commodity, a particular 
something that is not value but that has value. Contracts are made for money; in the 
English case, where silver has been conventionally chosen as money, contracts are 
silver, not for a name, nor for the value of an ounce of silver, and less for value in 
general. 
Locke is here denying the thesis of Lowndes that “shilling” is the name of a 
quantity of value. His view against Lowndes is that “shilling” is the name of a definite 
quantity of silver. If silver is chosen as the standard of price, one cannot ask about the 
value of silver (in general, about the value of the standard of price), because that would amount to asking about the price of silver, which is the value of silver in terms of silver. 
It would amount to asking about the value of money in terms of money. Exchange 
value, being a relation among things, is not any of the things related. To choose silver 
as money is to choose silver as the standard of price, answers Locke to Lowndes, from 
which it follows that an equal quantity of money means an equal quantity of silver, no 
matter what the value of silver in relation to the rest of the commodities might be. 
Therefore, the landlords and the money lenders get 20% less money when they get 20% 
less silver under Lowndes’ plan of debasement according to the high market price of 
silver bullion. 
One may come to the rescue of Lowndes by replying to Locke that the matter 
of contract is value, not money, or that it is money in so far as money stands for value, 
that giving money is just a means of giving value. That contracts are not made for value 
is plain; that they were made for “shillings” and the like at the time of Lowndes and 
Locke is plain too, but the question is all about the relationship between silver and 
money and between money and value. According to Lowndes, 1 light shilling represents 
the same money as 1 heavy shilling as long as the stamp upon the coin remains the 
same. According to Locke, by contrast, 1 light shilling represents less money than 1 
heavy shilling because it contains less silver. 
Indeed, if one consistently follows the basic idea of Lowndes, one is led to say 
that there is no limit to the reduction in the metallic content of the English silver coins. 
The less valuable the stuff of which money is made, the better, for the lower the cost of 
the means of payment. Locke does not question that a less expensive means of payment 
involves a lower cost; his point is directed, rather, to the view that the introduction of 
monetary names suppresses the role of silver as measure of value. From the perspective 
of Locke, one could say that Lowndes is right to imply that silver could be substituted 
for cheaper representatives in actual payments, but wrong to say that this possibility 
breaks the link between silver and money, that is, that the replacement of silver by 
tokens in circulation puts a quantity of value as standard of price instead of a quantity of 
silver. As I see it, Locke is right to reply to Lowndes that 1 ounce of silver, whatever the 
name given to it, will always represent the same amount of money, regardless of the 
variations of the value of silver in relation to the rest of the commodities. For Locke, contrary to Lowndes, “shilling” is the name of a definite quantity of silver, of some 
particular commodity; never of a quantity of value. 
“Cacao Nuts were the Money of a part of America, when we first came thither. Suppose then 
you had lent me last Year 300, or fifteen-score Cacao Nuts, to be repaid this Year: Would you be satisfied 
and think your self paid your due, if I should tell you, Cacao Nuts were scarce this Year, and that four-
score were of as much value this year as an hundred the last; and that therefore you were well and fully 
paid if I restored to you only 240 for the 300 I borrow'd? Would you not think your self defrauded of one 
fifth of your Right by such a payment? nor would it make any amends for this to Justice, or Reparation to 
you, that the Publick had (after your contract, which was made for fifteen Score) alter'd the denomination 
of Score, and applyed it to sixteen instead of twenty. Examine it, and you will find this just the Case, and 
the Loss proportionable in them both: That is, a real Loss of 20 per Cent.” (Locke, 1697) 
Locke is right to claim that it is senseless to say that 240 cacao-nuts have now 
the same worth as 300 before at the same time that cacao-nut are the standard of price. 
The statement that the value of the cacao-nuts has changed in time presupposes a prior 
standard of value beyond the cacao-nuts. But there cannot be any standard of price 
beyond the standard of price. We could say that the standard of price is the ultimate 
standard of price, which means that the standard of price does not have price in some 
ulterior standard of price. If it had, that ulterior commodity would be the true standard 
of price. If the cacao-nut is selected as the measure of value (and the only way to do this 
is to declare the cacao-nut to be the standard of price) 300 cacao-nuts must always be 
20% more money than 240 cacao-nuts, no matter how much the value of cacao-nuts in 
relation to gold or cinnamon might change. On cannot appeal here either to the marginal 
utility theory of value and say that the marginal utility of the cacao-nuts falls as the 
receiver of the payment gets cacao-nuts and his preference for cacao-nuts remains the 
same. Cacao nuts do not count here as use values, but as representatives of exchange 
value. The receiver of cacao nuts in payment is not meant to consume them; they do not 
represent food, but money, subjects of exchange value. 
In my opinion, Locke strikes the right note when he says that two ounces of 
silver will always represent double the quantity of money than one ounce of silver 
because the value of two ounces of silver is double the value of one ounce of silver, 
regardless of the variation in the value of silver in relation to other commodities. Equal 
quantities of silver always represent the same money; this is the ground on which Locke 
attacks the thesis of Lowndes that the debasement of the English silver coins according to the market bullion price just acknowledges the rise in value of silver. Silver cannot 
rise in value if silver is the measure of value, answers Locke; or better: the value of 
silver in relation to other commodities is irrelevant for its role of measure of value as 
standard of price. Silver is the measure of value in so far as 2 ounces of silver represent 
double amount of silver than 1 ounce. This is why a rise in the value of silver (in 
relation to the rest of commodities, of course) although it changes the (n-1) relations 
between silver and each of the other commodities, does not alter the relations between 
the (n-1) quantities of silver that are related to each commodity as its silver or money 
price. In a word: the changes in the value of the measure of value are irrelevant for the 
determination of relative prices, and value exists only as relative price. 
“Hence it is evident, that an equal quantity of Silver is always of equal value to an equal 
quantity of Silver.” (Locke, 1697) 
Locke is right here. The value of silver, as that of any commodity, is variable. 
In measuring value according to a standard of price, what matters is that equal amounts 
of silver will always bear the same relation or proportion, which is 1:1. No matter what 
the value of silver in terms of any other commodity may be, it will always remain true 
that the value of two ounces of silver is double the value of one ounce of silver. It is in 
this sense that silver is the standard of price, and it is in this sense that silver is measure 
of value. We can only measure value as price, which means that silver is measure of 
value in the sense that it is standard of price. For a standard of price to be a good 
standard, what counts is the equality of its parts, that every silver coin contains exactly 
the same amount of silver of the same quality. Locke, unlike Lowndes, is aware of this 
the distinction between the two functions of silver as measure of value and as means of 
exchange and, unlike Lowndes, does not mix them up: 
“Silver (…) is the thing bargain'd for, as well as the measure of the bargain; and in Commerce 
passes from the buyer to the seller, as being in such a quantity equivalent to the thing sold: And so it not 
only measures the value of the Commodity it is apply'd to, but is given in Exchange for it, as of equal 
value. But this it does, (as is visible) only by its quantity, and nothing else. For it must be remembered, 
that Silver is the Instrument as well as Measure of Commerce, and is given in exchange for the things 
Traded for.” (Locke, 1697) 
That silver is chosen as the standard of price does not imply that the debts 
measured in silver are to discharged by silver itself. Also, the fact that silver may be the general instrument of trade does not imply that debts have to be estimated in silver. 
This is important in so far as it has to do with inconvertibility. The substitution of 
inconvertible paper for gold in trade does not mean anything as to the elimination of 
gold from its role of standard of price, though it dispenses with gold as means of 
payment and, as such, represents a general saving for the whole of the economy. Thus, 
the substitution of inconvertible paper for gold does not lead to any emancipation of 
“real economic relations” from money or from gold. 
Marx puts the same idea as follows, and introduces a further distinction on the 
mater of measure of value that makes clearer the basic idea correctly hinted at by 
Locke. This further distinction leaves aside the role of means of payment and 
concerned the relation between the measure of value and is between value and price: 
“As measure of Value, and as standard of price, money has two entirely distinct functions to 
perform. It is the measure of value inasmuch as it is the socially recognised incarnation of human labour; 
it is the standard of price inasmuch as it is a fixed weight of metal. As the measure of value it serves to 
convert the values of all the manifold commodities into prices, into imaginary quantities of gold; as the 
standard of price it measures those quantities of gold. The measure of values measures commodities 
considered as values; the standard of price measures, on the contrary, quantities of gold by a unit quantity 
of gold, not the value of one quantity of gold by the weight of another. In order to make gold a standard 
of price, a certain weight must be fixed upon as the unit. In this case, as in all cases of measuring 
quantities of the same denomination, the establishment of an unvarying unit of measure is all-important. 
Hence, the less the unit is subject to variation, so much the better does the standard of price fulfil its 
office. But only in so far as it is itself a product of labour, and, therefore, potentially variable in value, can 
gold serve as a measure of value.” (Marx, 1867, 70) 
3. Lowndes’ Two Theories On the “Value of Money” 
Locke attacks the views of Lowndes on the re-distributive neutrality of his plan 
of debasement by attacking the theory of the nominal standard of money. In so doing, 
he draws a clear (and, in my opinion, correct) distinction between the standard of price 
and the means of payment, that is, between money as measure of value and money as 
means of circulation. Once silver has been settled as the standard of price, silver 
remains the standard of price independently of the extent to which silver may be 
substituted for representatives in actual circulation. Locke attacks with all his dialectical 
artillery the basic principle of Lowndes that the excess of the market price of bullion 
over the mint-parity shows that the value of silver had risen in England. The essence of Locke’s attack to this principle is that it is senseless to say that the value of silver has 
changed when silver itself is the standard of price. To explain the excess of the market 
price of silver above the mint-parity as the consequence of as rise in the value of silver 
in terms of silver amounts to offering nonsense in place of an explanation and provides 
no theoretical basis for any course of action.  
It was a fact that the market price of silver was consistently higher than the 
mint-parity for a period of time. About this fact there is no debate. Lowndes intended to 
show that this fact was the empirical consequence of another (empirical) fact, which 
was the rise in the value of silver. Locke replied that this second fact does not exist, that 
it simply is meaningless language. Seemingly, in an attempt to account for the (in his 
opinion) two facts observed, Lowndes introduces the theoretical principle that the unit 
of money is a unit of value. This principle does not receive any support from the two 
facts just mentioned, nor do they contradict it. Indeed, and pace the empiricists, 
operationalists and the like, facts are unable to establish any theoretical principle. On 
the theoretical principle that a monetary name is the name of a definite quantity of 
exchange value (and not of silver) Lowndes concludes that the purchasing power of 
money remains constant as long as the monetary names of the values of the 
commodities remain constant. From this principle, Lowndes intends to show that a 
reduction in the silver content of the coins regulated by the excess of the market price of 
silver over the mint-parity would not involve any re-distribution of wealth. 
In my opinion, there are in Lowndes (or perhaps around Lowndes) two 
different and conflicting conceptions of the value of money. Lowndes holds at times, 
that the value of money is determined by the names of the coins, and not by the silver 
content of the coins. At other times, however, he maintains that the value of money is 
determined by the value of the silver contained in the coins. On this premise, he holds 
that the meanings of the names of the coins change as the value of the silver contained 
in them changes. To put it otherwise: Lowndes’ apology of his plan of debasement 
contains two conflicting theories of the value of money. On the one hand, Lowndes 
maintains that the monetary names are names of definite quantities of exchange value; it 
is on this premise that he argues that the changes in the silver content of the coins and 
even the changes in the value of that silver content are irrelevant for the determination 
of the purchasing power of the coins. In this first theory, all that counts in money is the monetary names. As long as one receives the same amount of coins with an invariable 
stamp upon them, one is always receiving the same amount of money. If the name of 
money remains the same, money remains the same. This means that the amount of silver 
contained in each crown coin is irrelevant to determine its purchasing power; also, it 
means that the value of the silver that the crown may contain is equally irrelevant to 
determine the purchasing power of the crown coin. When Lowndes goes this way, he 
sounds like an early prophet of inconvertible paper currency and seems to be on the 
verge of proposing the printing of crown marks on pieces of paper instead of on pieces 
of silver. 
This view has an interesting theoretical implication that I deem worth stressing. 
Ultimately, the thesis that the monetary names are the names of the value of 
commodities implies the abolition of money as measure of value. If the monetary names 
are names of the values of commodities, we have suppressed the relation of the value of 
commodities to money. If “crown” is the name of the exchange value of a quarter of 
wheat, we go directly to the value of wheat (the commodity) without passing through 
money. It would not make any sense to ask about the correspondence or adequacy of the 
value of money (of a silver crown, if you wish) to the value of a quarter of wheat. If we 
impose names directly on the value of commodities without the intermediation of silver, 
it logically follows that it would pay to withdraw silver from the sphere of payments 
altogether; ultimately, we have abolished money and deal directly with the value of 
commodities. I would like to remind the reader that, in Lowndes, the excess of the 
market price of silver bullion over the official mint-parity is never explained as the 
result of the loss of silver of the coins; this explanation is totally Locke’s. In Lowndes, 
whatever the loss in the silver content of the coins might be, the excess of the market 
price of silver over the mint-parity unequivocally shows that the value of silver has 
risen. 
However, Lowndes’ view that the silver content of the coins has to be changed 
in inverse proportion to the excess of the market price of silver over the official mint-
parity implies that the value of money (the purchasing power of the coins) is determined 
not by the name stamped upon them, as in the first theory just laid down, but by the 
value of the silver contained in them. Note well: the purchasing power of the crown 
coins, for instance, is determined not by the amount of silver (actual or hypothetically) contained in the crowns, but by the value of the silver of which the crown coins are 
made. When sticking to this second theory about the value of money, Lowndes is 
denying the previous priority that he gave to the monetary names or marks stamped 
upon the coins (the logical end of which is an inconvertible paper currency and the total 
displacement of the precious metals from circulation) and, in conflict with it, he says 
that the silver content of the coins is crucial, not as such, but its value -obviously, a 
metallic coin that contains no metal is a self-contradiction. This second theory sets a 
limit to the debasement of the coins, namely, the market price of silver. In the first 
theory there is no such limit to the debasement of the coins or, rather, the limit is the 
displacement of the precious metals from circulation. 
The conflict between Lowndes’ two conceptions of the value of money can be 
shown by comparing three terms, namely, a crown of silver, a crown of copper and a 
crown of paper. According to Lowndes’ first theory, the purchasing power of the three 
types of money is the same because the name on them is the same. On the contrary, 
according to his second theory, the value of the silver crown is determined by the value 
of the silver contained in it. As silver is more valuable than copper, a crown of copper 
has less value than a crown of silver and a crown of paper has less value than a crown of 
copper. It also follows that the value of the paper crown is but the value of the paper on 
which the crown sign is printed. The underlying principle is that the value of the three 
species of money is unequal even though the names are equal. In this second theory of 
Lowndes about the value of money, in opposition to the first, the door to an 
inconvertible paper currency is closed, because if there is no metal, it is absurd to base 
the value of coins on the value of a metal that simply is not there. An inconvertible 
paper currency is discarded and it is debatable whether there remains room for a 
convertible paper currency. 
Lowndes’ view that the English stock of silver had to be recoined according to 
the high price of silver bullion because the excess of the market price of silver over the 
mint-parity showed that the value of silver had risen, is based on his second theory of 
the value of money rather than on the first. The contention that such a debasement 
would not have any re-distributive effect of wealth is, however, another matter. From 
which of the two theories of Lowndes does it follow? Before taking up this question, let 
me point out that, ultimately, the reason why the silver content of the English silver coins had to be reduced by the same proportion as the proportion by which the market 
price of silver bullion was above the mint-parity was that the quantity of value that 
operates as unit of value (of money, would say Lowndes), as standard of price, is to be 
kept constant. This requires a constant variation of the mint-parity in inverse proportion 
to the variations of the market value of silver bullion: the silver content of a crown is to 
be cut when the market price of silver rises above the current mint-parity (and by the 
same proportion) and increased when it falls below the mint-parity (again, by the same 
proportion, of course). With such constant adjustment, the value of money would be 
kept constant because the name “crown” would always denote the same quantity of 
exchange value. There is more money in an ounce of silver when the value of silver rises 
and less when it falls. 
The question arises immediately: if all the theory that the justification of the 
plan of debasement needs is provided by the second theory, what does Lowndes 
introduce the first theory for? For what I see, my hypothesis is that Lowndes calls in his 
first theory about the value of money in order to defend that the debasement according 
to the high price of bullion does not imply any re-distribution of wealth. The second 
theory invites the debasement in; the first exonerates it of unpalatable re-distributive 
effects. However, according to Kleer (see Kleer, 2004), Lowndes did indeed believe that 
his debasement would cause re-distributive effects, despite his contrary public 
pronouncements. According to Kleer, Lowndes believed that his debasement would 
benefit the class that Lowndes intended to benefit (at the expense of the rest of society), 
which was the financiers of the English crown, then in desperate need of money to fight 
on the Succession War on the Continent. According to Kleer, Lowndes was a cunning 
statesman whose aim was to deceive the Parliament into the belief that a debasement of 
the English silver coins according to the excess of the market price of silver over the 
mint-parity would be re-distributionally neutral. Under the pretext of restring order to 
the English silver currency, the secret purpose of Lowndes was to make a present to his 
friends at the expense of the rest of the nation. According to Kleer, Lowndes believed 
that the financiers had large stocks of heavy silver coins. A debasement of the English 
silver coins would automatically multiply the amount of money in the hands of that 
class of people, as they owe large stocks of unworn and unclipped coins: all they have 
to do is melt the heavy coins and recoin the silver at the new high mint-parity. 
Independently of Kleer, I dare to suggest that even Lowndes’ references to an adjustment to the enhanced value of silver are a smokescreen and Lowndes did never 
seriously think of any “adjustment”. The story about the need to adjust the metal content 
of the coins to the increased value of silver simply provides an appearance of “technical 
necessity” to an essentially political maneuvre. Actually, any debasement would have 
done for Lowndes; only, the larger, the better, for the greater would be the gain of the 
financiers at the expense of the rest of the nation. 
Lowndes introduces his first theory about the value of money in the course of 
his defense of his plan of debasement (which is based on his second theory) only in 
order to reject the objection of Locke that such a debasement (and any debasement in 
general, no matter whether in accordance or variance with the divergence of the market 
price of silver bullion from the mint-parity) necessarily involves an arbitrary re-
distribution of wealth. 
Locke is right to reply to Lowndes: one cannot say that the debasement of the 
English shilling is the consequence of the rise in the purchasing power of silver against 
the monetary name shilling, because “shilling” is just the name of a definite amount of 
silver and not the name of the value of that silver (or of any amount of value). The 
relation between silver and shilling is that of convention, not of value. Shilling is the 
name of one of the many possible standards of price, that is, the name of a particular 
amount of silver, and silver is the standard of price. The view that the debasement of 
the silver coins represents a rise in the value of silver, or more in general, a rise in the 
value of the standard of price, implies that the debasement of the currency implies a rise 
in the value of the standard of price in relation to the standard of price itself, which is a 
“contradictio in adjecto”. 
Apart from his political and strategic interests, from a theoretical standpoint 
Lowndes confuses the possibility of dispensing with silver in actual circulation with the 
function of silver as standard of price. The fact that the creditor may accept payment in 
a representative of silver, which may be a coin with less silver, or a coin of bronze, or a 
piece of paper, does not mean anything for the role of silver as standard of price. The 
fact that the precious metals may be removed altogether from actual circulation does 
not mean anything as to the “stability” of the standard of price. 4. Steuart’s Criticism of Locke’ Position About the Beneficiaries of the Planned 
Debasement 
First, Steuart agrees with Locke against Lowndes that the debasement 
according to the high price of bullion cannot be defended on the basis of a rise in the 
value of the standard of price. He aggress with Locke that, once silver has been set as 
the standard of price, to say that the excess of the value of silver bullion over the mint-
parity shows that the value of silver has risen is just nonsense, because, as Locke 
correctly noted, it amounts to saying that the value of silver in terms of silver has risen. 
Secondly, Steuart joins forces with Locke to claim against Lowndes that any 
debasement entails a re-distribution of wealth, even a debasement according to the 
market price of bullion. However, he disagrees with Locke as to the beneficiaries of the 
automatic re-distribution of wealth that a debasement implies. According to Steuart, 
Locke is right to hold that the debasement takes wealth (money) away from the class of 
creditors and landlords, but wrong to say that this money ends up in the hands of those 
who possess heavy coins. Steuart points out against Locke that the latter view amounts 
to the admission of the thesis of Lowndes that the debasement (according to the high 
price of bullion) is not inflationary. The right conclusion that Locke should have 
deduced from his correct premises, is that the wealth that the debasement takes away 
from the creditors and the landlords ends up in the hands of the debtors. 
Steuart looks into the debate between Lowndes and Locke in order to illustrate 
his following thesis: 
“Every variation upon the intrinsic value of the money-unit has the effect of benefiting the 
class of creditors, at the expence of debtors, or vice versa.” (Steuart, 1767 [1966], 40) 
By “intrinsic value of the money-unit” Steuart means the quantity of precious 
metal contained by convention in the money-unit. According to his thesis, the 
debasement of the currency is relevant only as far as debt relations are concerned. He 
summarizes the polemic between Locke and Lowndes as follows: 
“In 1695 a proposal was made to the government of England, to diminish the value of the 
pound sterling by 20 per cent by making a new coinage of all the silver, and by making every shilling 1/5 
lighter than before. The author of this project (Mr Lowndes) having given his scheme to the public, was 
answered by Mr Locke, that this debasing of the value of the money-unit was effectually defrauding all 
the landed interest of 20 per cent of their rents. Lowndes replied, that silver was augmented 20 per cent in its value, and that therefore the pound sterling, though reduced 20 per cent in its weight of pure silver, 
was still as valuable as before. This proposition Mr Locke exploded with the most solid reasoning, and 
indeed nothing could be more absurd, than to affirm, that silver had risen in value with respect to itself.” 
(Steuart, 1767 [1966], 41) 
Thus, Steuart agrees with Locke that the excess of the market price of silver 
over the official mint-parity cannot be viewed, as Lowndes does, as a revaluation of 
silver. We already saw that Locke, against Lowndes, explained the excess of the market 
price of silver over the mint-parity as the manifestation of the loss of content of the 
silver coins. Steuart agrees with Locke that it is absurd to say that the value of silver has 
risen when silver itself is the measure of value or standard of price. 
“But though Mr Locke felt that all the landed interest, and all those who were creditors in 
permanent contracts, must lose 20 per cent by Mr Lowndes's scheme, yet he did not perceive (which is 
very wonderful) that the debtors in these contracts must gain. This led him to advance a very 
extraordinary proposition, which abundantly proves that the interests of debtors and creditors, which are 
now become of the utmost consequence to be considered attentively by modern statesmen, were then but 
little attended to, and still less understood. (Steuart, 1767 [1966], 42; italics mine) 
On what basis did Locke denied that debtors would gain what creditors lose 
with a debasement? Or should we say with an inflation? 
“We find in the 46th page of Mr Locke's Farther Considerations concerning raising the value of 
Money, that Mr Lowndes had affirmed in support of his scheme, that this new money would pay as much 
debt, and buy as many commodities as the then money which was one fifth heavier.” (Steuart, 1767 
[1966],42) 
This implies that it was Lowndes’ view that nominal prices would not rise as a 
consequence of the debasement; all that will happen is that silver prices will fall by one 
fifth, but shilling prices would remain the same. Locke, on the contrary, held that 
nominal prices will rise by one fifth and that silver prices will stay the same. Lowndes 
held that his debasement will not trigger any inflation of monetary prices: nominal or 
“coin” prices will remain constant after the debasement and, therefore, relative prices 
will also remain constant. On the contrary, silver prices should fall (though uniformly) 
as the value of silver, according to Lowndes, has risen. Steuart clearly disagrees with 
these views of Lowndes and agrees with Locke that the debasement will raise by one 
fifth nominal or coin prices so as to leave silver prices constant: it will raise “coin” 
prices by the full proportion of the diminution of the official metal content of the coins. On this debate, Steuart takes sides with Locke: after the debasement, more lighter coins 
will be given for the same goods so as to maintain constant the amount of silver given in 
payment. 
It is clear, however, that a 20% debasement of the silver shilling produces 120 
coins of one shilling where there were 100. 120 coins after the debasement contain 
exactly the same amount of silver as 100 coins before the debasement. Lowndes would 
have to say that the owner of heavy coins sees his money increased or multiplied by 
20% as a result of the debasement. Lowndes would have to say that the owner of heavy 
coins, after the debasement, has the same silver, but more money; he has 20% more 
money because he has 20% more value (silver, according to Lowndes, has risen in value 
by 20%, and the quantity of silver owned has not changed). The owner of heavy coins 
has 20% more shillings because he has 20% more value. How could Lowndes claim that 
the debasement, which multiplies the amount of money in the hands of the owners of 
heavy coins, does not have any redistributive effects? Neither Lowndes nor any of his 
enemies raise this question which, therefore, remains un-debated and unanswered. 
Steuart agrees with Locke that Lowndes’ debasement would not be neutral as 
far as the distribution of wealth is concerned. He agrees with Locke as to the losers, but 
disagrees as to the beneficiaries. We have seen that, according to Locke, the wealth lost 
by the landlords and money lenders will end up in the hands of those who happen to 
own heavy coins. Why? There is here a curious coincidence between Lowndes’ secret 
aims and Locke’s public declarations, as Locke claims that the possessors of heavy 
coins would be unjustly enriched by Lowndes’ debasement because it will multiply the 
amount of money in their hands. Steuart replies to Locke that he is wring to arrive at 
this conclusion. Steuart claims that, in holding that the debasement will favor those who 
have heavy coins because it will multiply their money by one fifth, Locke implicitly 
conceding the theory of Lowndes that the excess of the market price of silver over the 
mint-parity shows that the same silver represents more money! 
The reason is that, if one holds that, as a consequence of the debasement, 
nominal prices will rise by 20% so as to leave constant the amount of silver exchanged 
for goods, then to have heavy coins represents no advantage after the debasement. It 
would if Lowndes was right and coin prices remained constant. But if, as Locke 
contends, coin prices will rise by 20%, the increase in the amount of coins for the holders of heavy coins, from, say, 100 to 120, is exactly offset by the increment of the 
nominal price level, which, according to Locke, will be of 20% too. Those who posses 
heavy coins, my melting them and recoining the silver obtained according to the higher 
mint-parity, will get more coins, true, but this increase in the quantity of coins is exactly 
offset by the fall in the purchasing power of each coin (rise in nominal commodity 
prices). To hold that the possessors of heavy coins will be favored by the debasement 
because their money will be multiplied by 20% logically necessitates to admit the thesis 
of Lowndes that coin prices will not be affected by the debasement. Thus, Steuart 
correctly observes against Locke: 
“If the authority of any man could prevail, where reason is dark, it would be that of Mr Locke; 
and had any other than such a person as Locke advanced such a doctrine, I should have taken no notice of 
it. Here this great man, through inadvertency, at once gives up the argument in favour of his antagonist, 
after having refuted him in the most solid manner: for if a man, who at that time had hoarded heavy 
money upon its being coined into pieces 1/5 lighter were to gain Mr Locke must agree with Mr Lowndes, 
that a light piece was as much worth as a heavy one.” (Steuart, 1767 [1966], 43) 
The one who is in the deeper trouble here is Lowndes, because, on what ground 
could he justify that his planned debasement would not benefit the holders of heavy 
coins and, therefore, that his debasement did not have any re-distributive effect? It is 
interesting that Locke does not raise this question against him. To defend the neutrality 
of his debasement, Lowndes would have to say that it is no gain for the owner of heavy 
coins to have his money multiplied by 20%.Either one agrees with Locke and Steuart or 
there is no way to deny that the debasement represents a windfall gain for the holders of 
heavy coins. Unlike Locke, Steuart is coherent and claims that it is true that the owners 
of heavy coins will not benefit form the debasement because of the inflation that should 
ensue. Here is Steuarts correction of Locke: 
“Those who had heavy money at that time locked up in their coffers, would gain no doubt, 
provided they were debtors (KO: my emphasis); because having, I shall suppose, borrowed 4000 l. 
sterling in heavy money, and having a like sum borrowed from their coffers, augmented to 5000 l. by Mr 
Lowndes's plan, they might pay their debt of 4000 l. and retain one thousand clear profit for themselves. 
But supposing them to have no debts, which way could they possibly gain by having heavy money, since 
the 5000 l. after the coinage, would have bought no more land, nor more of any commodities, than 4000 l. 
would have done before the coinage.” (Steuart, 1767 [1966], 44) 
Steuart, thus, concludes: “We may therefore safely conclude, that every diminution of the metals contained in the 
money-unit, must imply a loss to all creditors; and that in proportion to this loss, those who are debtors 
must gain.” (Steuart, 1767 [1966], 44) 
Compare to Kleer, who accepts the view of Locke and ignores the criticism of 
Steuart to Locke: 
“It certainly did not escape Locke's attention that raising the coin would amount to a massive 
handout to the financial community. He complained that the benefits would go to “those …who have 
great Sums of weighty Money hoarded up by them. To those by the proposed change of our Money will 
be an increase of one fifth added to their Riches, paid out of the Pockets of the rest of the Nation. For 
what these men received [from their depositors] for Four Shillings, they will pay [out] again for Five”. 
The gains to hoarders -bankers and tax collectors for the most part- would come mainly at the expense of 
the gentry, who were already carrying a disproportionately heavy burden.” (Kleer, 2004, 550-1) 
According to this passage, Locke was defending the gentry against the hoarders 
(holders of heavy coins) whom Kleer identifies as the bankers and tax collectors. Kleer 
accepts the opinion of Locke, which Steuart criticizes as wrong, that Lowndes’ 
debasement would benefit the holders of heavy coins, not the debtors. Besides, 
according to Marx, Locke did not aim at defending the gentry, but precisely, the 
bankers, to whom his scheme granted a re-distribution of wealth as long as it required 
the repayment of debts contracted in light shillings with heavy shillings.  
Was Steuart right to pronounce wrong Locke’s answer to the question about 
the advantages to the holders of heavy coins? Look at what Locke writes where he 
denounces that Lowndes’ debasement will confiscate one fifth of the wealth of 
landlords and money lenders: 
“No body else, but these Hoarders, can get a Farthing by this proposed change of our Coin; 
unless Men in Debt have Plate [KO: objects made of silver, not silver coins, I guess] by them, which they 
will Coin to pay their Debts. Those too, I must confess, will get One fifth by all the Plate of their own, 
which they shall Coin and pay Debts with; valuing their Plate at Bullion.” (Locke, 1697) 
This seems to agree with Steuart, as here, the debtors see their debts cut by 
20% as a consequence of the debasement of the coins! But the story continues and 
Locke qualifies this thesis and discards his basically correct intuition on the ground of 
practical considerations: “But if they shall consider the fashion of their Plate, what that cost when they bought it, and 
the fashion that new Plate will cost them, if they intend ever to have Plate again, they will find this One 
fifth seeming present profit in Coining their Plate to pay their Debts, amount to little or nothing at all. No 
body then but the Hoarders will get by this Twenty per Cent [KO: because the debasement multiplies the 
amount of coins of their property, and not because they have to repay heavy coin debts in light coins]. 
And I challenge any one to shew how any body else (but that little in the case of Plate Coin'd to pay 
Debts) shall get a Farthing by it.” (Locke, 1697) 
As the melting the objects of silver and the coining them into new coins 
involves a cost comparable to the diminution of the debts, the debtors who possess of 
objects of silver will not be substantially benefited by Lowndes’ debasement. Locke 
goes on: 
“It seems to promise fairest to the Debtors; but to them too it will amount to nothing. For he 
that takes up Money to pay his Debts, will receive this new Money, and pay it again at the same rate he 
received it, just as he does now our present Coin, without any profit at all.” (Locke, 1697) 
This proves that the debtor will not gain in a future debt taken in debased 
coins, but fails to prove that he does not gain when he has to repay a debt taken in 
heavy coins with debased coins. Who gets what the debasement takes away from the 
holders of assets? Locke’s, answer is: the holders of the corresponding liabilities do not 
get it. The whole gain is for those who hold silver bullion. Why? Because their money 
is multiplied by the debasement. According to Steuart, this answer is wrong. The thesis 
that the holders of silver bullion gain because the same silver represents more money 
after the debasement implicitly accepts the thesis of Lowndes that was to be rejected. 
Steuart answers: the holders of bullion gain what the holders of assets lose in so far as 
the holders of silver bullion are debtors, that is, in so far as they hold the corresponding 
liabilities, not in so far as they hold cash balances, because relative prices stay the 
same. I conclude, therefore, that Steuart is right in his criticism of Locke. 
5. Marx  
Marx comments on the debate between Lowndes and Locke in order to refute 
the theory of the “nominal standard of money”, which is the thesis that the monetary 
names stand for definite quantities of value; to put it otherwise, the thesis that the unit of 
money is a unit of value. In the “Contribution”, which is where Marx expressly 
comments on the Lowndes-Locke debate, he attributes the theory of the nominal standard of money to Lowndes, Steuart (!), Berkeley and Attwood. Marx supports 
Locke’s refutation of Lowndes’ version of the theory, though, most interestingly, he 
notes that Locke himself embraced this theory in the places where he claimed that the 
loans granted in light coins should be repaid in heavy coins because what counts is the 
nominal amount of money. We shall presently look at that. 
Marx explains that the theory of the nominal standard of value arises from the 
confusion of the function of money as measure of value with its function of standard of 
price. The variability of the value of the commodity selected as measure of value does 
not preclude its function of standard of price, because the commodity that acts as 
standard of price does so in virtue of the relation between different physical portions of 
that commodity; this is but the principle that we already saw in Locke that silver acts as 
measure of value as long as the value of two ounces of silver will always be double the 
value of one ounce, whatever the value of silver in relation to the rest of commodities 
might be. Thus, the standard of price is a determinate amount of gold or silver, not the 
value of a determinate amount of gold and silver. As Locke correctly noted, says Marx, 
the very notion of “price of the standard of price” or of “value of the measure of value” 
is nonsense. 
“The fact that commodities are only nominally converted in the form of prices into gold and 
hence gold is only nominally [KO: it would be better “ideally”] transformed into money led to the 
doctrine of the nominal standard of money. Because only imaginary gold or silver, i.e., gold and silver 
merely as money of account, is used in the determination of prices, it was asserted that the terms pound, 
shilling, pence, thaler, franc, etc., denote ideal particles of value but not weights of gold or silver or any 
form of materialised labour.” (Marx, 1970, 76) 
The theory of the “nominal standard of money” implies that the standard of 
price is a standard of value, or, in more updated terminology, that the numeraire is a 
unit of value. For Marx, this is a major mistake: a monetary name is not the name of a 
determinate amount of value, of a determinate quantum of exchange value, but a 
standard of price, the name of a definite quantum not of value, but of a metal; more in 
general, of some particular commodity which has value but is not value as such. The 
variations in the value of the commodity that serves as standard of price in relation to 
the rest of the commodities do not “falsify” prices: the reason is that for any change in 
the value of, say, silver, in relation to each of the other commodities, the silver relative 
prices of the commodities other than silver remain the same, and exchange value is precisely, a relation. The relation between constant quantities of silver, whatever the 
value of silver in relation to the rest of the commodities, is the objective expression of 
the exchange value of commodities. This means that the variations in the value of silver 
do not require any change in the amount of silver referred by the monetary names. Such 
a change could not be defended on the basis of “monetary stability”, because money is 
not value already that is, it is not value as such, but a commodity that has value as an 
adjective property. 
Interestingly, and in contrast to the standard literature, Marx poses the debate 
between Lowndes and Locke in relation to the repayment of the debts already taken by 
the English government, that is, in relation to the repayment of the English public debt, 
rather than in relation to a strategy to attract more loans to finance the expenses of the 
English crown, as is the case in the standard literature. As we have seen, it was fairly 
well known that the Treasury of England had been financing itself with debts taken in 
light shillings. Were these debts to be repaid in light or in heavy coins once it became 
apparent that the condition of English silver coins was appalling? 
“The government debts had been contracted in light shillings, were they to be repaid in coins 
of standard weight?” (Marx, 1970, 77) 
If Lowndes’ plan was not followed and the English stock of silver was 
recoined at the official mint-parity, as Locke contended it should, the English Treasury 
would have to repay in heavy coins a huge amount of debts taken in light coins. It 
would be hardly surprising to learn that Lowndes, as secretary of the Treasury, was not 
very happy about this prospect. 
“Instead of saying pay back 4 ounces of silver for every 5 ounces you received nominally but 
which contained in fact only 4 ounces of silver, he [KO: Lowndes] said, on the contrary, pay back 
nominally 5 ounces but reduce their metal content to 4 ounces and call the amount you hitherto called 4/5 
of a shilling a shilling. Lowndes's action, therefore, was in reality based on the metal content, whereas in 
theory he stuck to the name of account.” (Marx, 1970, 77) 
Lowndes did not choose the most obvious way, which was to make official 
that, as was well known, the government debts had been contracted not in heavy but in 
light shillings. Even the lenders themselves to the English Treasury knew only too well 
that they had lent it light coins. If, in fact, the English government had actually received light coins, let its creditors be repaid in light coins; this would be the simple but logical 
path that Lowndes, surely for political reasons, chose not to go. If the creditor protests 
that he is receiving 4 ounces for every 5 he lent, it is easy to dismiss his claim 
answering that, in fact, he lent out 4 ounces, not 5. However, the fact that Lowndes did 
not chose to go this arithmetically obvious way does not mean by any means that he 
was prepared to repay loans taken in light coins in heavy coins. His plan to repay the 
loans taken in light coins with light coins was the somewhat more complicated of 
recoining the silver of England and debase it in accordance with the high market price 
of silver bullion. The arrangement that Lowndes designed to avoid a premium for the 
English financial aristocracy at the expense of the Treasury was that the mint 
acknowledge the loss in metal of the English silver coins and set the mint-parity in 
accordance with the current higher value of silver bullion. 
The thrust of Lowndes’ project was, therefore, to call now 5 ounces what 
previously was called 4 ounces. The creditor is paid back 5 under the name of 4, which 
would accord with the reality that he lent out 4 under the name of 5. This means that, in 
actual fact, Lowndes was taken a quantity of money to be a quantity of silver, regardless 
the value of that silver or of the signs stamped upon the coins, that is, regardless the 
name given to a determinate amount of silver. On this account, Marx’ presentation is 
revealing, as it shows that Lowndes was in fact Lockean when it came to the repayment 
of the outstanding English pubic debt! The theory of the value of money that Locke 
launched against Lowndes’ apology of debasement was but the theory that Lowndes 
was actually embracing in order to ensure the repayment of debts contracted in light 
coins with light coins: there are equals amount of money where there are equal amounts 
of silver, regardless that value of silver in relation to the rest of commodities and the 
names given to the fractions of silver. This is what Marx is saying when he writes that 
“Lowndes’ action was based on the metal content” as far as his plan to acknowledge the 
actual metallic content of the coins. 
“His opponents [KO: of Lowndes’ plan] on the other hand, who simply clung to the name of 
account and therefore declared that a shilling of standard weight was identical with a shilling which was 
25 to 50 per cent lighter, claimed to be adhering to the metal content. John Locke (...) took up Lowndes's 
challenge. John Locke won the day and money borrowed in guineas containing 10 to 14 shillings was 
repaid in guineas of 20 shillings.” (Marx, 1970, 77) Just as Lowndes was in fact Lockean in relation to the mechanism of 
repayment of the outstanding English public debt, Locke was likewise Lowndesian in 
relation to that matter, and opposed the debasement put forward by Lowndes on the 
theory of the nominal standard of money! Ultimately, the English stock of silver was 
recoined, but not debased as Locke proposed against Lowndes. This means that the 
loans in light coins that the English financial aristocracy had made to the Treasury were 
to be paid back (together with interest, of course) in heavy coins, which implies a 
massive re-distribution of wealth towards the English financial aristocracy, a 
redistribution that Lowndes tried to avoid and Locke defended. Marx suggests that 
Locke was fully aware of this “re-distributive” effect. Kleer provides an interesting clue 
when he recalls us that Locke had to escape to Holland from London’s goldsmiths in 
order to save his life; he quotes a letter of some Pawling to Locke where Pawling says: 
“Truly ‘twas time for you to be gon, for you attempted the ruine of their Diana and put a stop 
to that craft by which such K[naves] have got their gain.” (Pawling to Locke, quoted in Kleer, 2004, 552) 
For those who might not remember the passage of the New Testament referred 
to by Pawling: 
“The reference is to Acts 19:23-41. Two of Paul’s disciples were almost killed at Ephesus by 
an angry mob stirred up by silversmiths specializing in shrines of the goddess Diana –whose divinity 
Paul had called into question.” (Kleer, 2004, 552) 
This suggests that, in the time around the Great Recoinage of 1696, in addition 
to the conflicts of the English Tresaury with its lenders, there was a strong conflict 
between the goldsmiths and the bankers, between the old usury establishment and the 
then emerging British banking industry. Marx sees in the Great Recoinage of 1696 a 
triumph of the young English banking industry against the old usurers (and against the 
rest of the English nation). The picture that emerges is one in which Lowndes tries to 
defend the interests of the English Treasury from both the banks and the goldsmiths, as 
Locke decidedly supports the young English banking industry as against the old usury. 
Marx knew the power of the usurers who tried to chase Locke; in a footnote to vol. 3 
chapter 36 of “Capital”, he quotes from English authors of the time: 
“The rich goldsmith” (the precursor of the banker), “for example, made Charles II of England 
pay twenty and thirty per cent for accommodation. A business so profitable, induced the goldsmith ‘more 
and more to become lender to the King, to anticipate all the revenue, to take every grant of Parliament into pawn as soon as it was given; also to outvie each other in buying and taking to pawn bills, orders, 
and tallies, so that, in effect, all the revenue passed through their hands’.” (John Francis, History of the 
Bank of England, London, 1848, I, p.31.) “The erection of a bank had been suggested several times 
before that. It was at last a necessity” (l. c., p. 38). “The bank was a necessity for the government itself, 
sucked dry by usurers, in order to obtain money at a reasonable rate, on the security of parliamentary 
grants.” (l. c., pp. 59, 60).” (Marx, 1991, 737n) 
Returning to the “Contribution”, it is to be noted that Marx accepts the final 
diagnosis of Sir James Steuart: 
“Sir James Steuart gives the following ironical summary of this operation: “...the state gained 
considerably upon the score of taxes, as well as the creditors upon their capitals and interest; and the 
nation, which was the principal loser, was pleased, because their standard” (the standard of their own 
value) “was not debased”.” (Marx, 1970, 77) 
The State gained “upon the score of taxes” because, after the recoinage at the 
old mint-parity, taxes were paid in full-weight money rather than in clipped money, as 
before. In other words: after the Recoinage at the old mint-parity, the tax payers had to 
give the State more silver under the same monetary name to cancel their tax debts 
which represented an advantage for the Treasury and a valuable means to better carry 
the burden of the repayment of the debts taken in light coins with heavy coins. The big 
loser was the class of debtors (which is the class that Steuart seems to have in mind 
when speaking of “the nation”: those who are neither bankers nor the government), as 
the recoinage led them to having to repay full-weight coins for debts contracted in 
clipped coins. 
The inversion of the relative positions of Lowndes and Locke at some time of 
the debate is one of the most interesting aspects of Marx’ commentary of this episode, 
and it is something that I have not seen in the standard literature on the debate. In 
saying that the creditors have to have their loans repaid with heavy coins instead of 
with light coins, Locke is implicitly embracing the principle of Lowndes that the value 
of money is determined by the monetary names! After all, all the argument of Locke is 
that the creditors lent a definite number of shillings. They are to be paid back in heavy 
shillings because law is to be complied with, despite the fact that they lent out light 
shillings, simply because they lent a determinate amount of shillings, and a shilling is 
always a shilling, independently of its metal content. According to Marx, Locke rejects 
the theory of the nominal standard of money in so far as the debasement of the English silver coins is concerned, but he embraces it in so far as the estimation of the English 
State debts is concerned. 
Marx extracts interesting lessons from the debate: 
“The rate at which a token of value -whether it consists of paper or bogus gold and silver is 
quite irrelevant- can take the place of definite quantities of gold and silver calculated according to the 
mint-price depends on the number of tokens in circulation and by no means on the material of which they 
are made.” (Marx, 1970, 78) 
This would be the case of the worn silver coins. 
“The difficulty in grasping this relation is due to the fact that the two functions of money -as a 
standard of value and as medium of circulation- are governed not only by conflicting laws, but by laws 
which appear to be at variance with the antithetical features of the two functions.” (Marx, 1970, 78) 
Marx develops this idea: 
“As regards its function as a standard of value, when money serves solely as money of account 
and gold merely as nominal gold, it is the physical material used which is the crucial factor. Exchange-
values expressed in terms of silver, or as silver prices, look of course quite different from exchange-
values expressed in terms of gold, or as gold prices. On the other hand, when it functions as a medium of 
circulation, when money is not just imaginary but must be present as a real thing side by side with other 
commodities, its material is irrelevant and its quantity becomes the crucial factor. Although whether it is a 
pound of gold, of silver or of copper is decisive for the standard measure, mere number makes the coin an 
adequate embodiment of any of these standard measures, quite irrespective of its own material. But it is at 
variance with common sense that in the case of purely imaginary money everything should depend on the 
physical substance, whereas in the case of the corporeal coin everything should depend on a numerical 
relation that is nominal.” (Marx, 1970, 120-1) 
The following criticism of Marx to Fullarton in the first volume of “Capital”, 
allowing for the different institutional circumstances, fits perfectly in the Lowndes-
Locke debate: 
“The following passage from Fullarton shows the want of clearness on the part of even the 
best writers on money, in their comprehension of its various functions: “That, as far as concerns our 
domestic exchanges, all the monetary functions which are usually performed by gold and silver coins, 
may be performed as effectually by a circulation of inconvertible notes paying no value but that fictitious 
and conventional value they derive from the law is a fact which admits, I conceive, of no denial. Value of 
this description may be made to answer all the purposes of intrinsic value, and supersede even the necessity for a standard, provided only the quantity of issues be kept under due limitation.” (Fullerton: 
“Regulation of Currencies”, London, 1845, p. 21.) Because the commodity that serves as money is 
capable of being replaced in circulation by mere symbols of value, therefore its functions as a measure of 
value and a standard of prices are declared to be superfluous!” (Marx, 1971, 104n) 
CONCLUSIONS 
1) The theory of the nominal standard of money is the outcome of the 
confusion of the function of money as standard of price-measure of value with its 
function of means of payment. At some time of the discussion, both Lowndes and 
Locke fail to see the distinction between silver as standard of price from silver as 
medium of circulation. This is what leads to the thesis that the value of money is the 
amount of value referred to by the monetary names, which implies that the amount of 
silver contained in the silver coins is irrelevant for their ability to discharge debts. The 
grain of truth in this view is that the position of (a determinate amount of) silver as 
standard of price does not require silver to be actually present at the time of payment.  
The standard of price need not be present at the actual exchanges. We might 
say with Marx that, by setting silver as the standard of price, we turn the rest of the 
commodities into silver in an ideal way. The introduction of monetary names, the 
printing of marks on the coins is simply a contrivance to avoid the trouble of weighing 
them and the trouble of assessing the purity of the silver contained in the coins. In 
particular, the coins do not discharge debts in virtue of their names, but in virtue of their 
silver content, as both authors acknowledge at some time of their debate. 
Locke is closer to the truth than Lowndes when he notes that the value of silver 
as against each of the other commodities of the economy is irrelevant for the function of 
silver as standard of price. What constitutes silver as standard of price is the selection of 
particular quantity of silver as the unit of price, or in another way, that silver functions 
as standard of price in virtue of the proportion between the different quantities of silver 
that express the values of the rest of the commodities, but not the value of the standard 
quantity of silver in relation to each of the other commodities. Lowndes’ theory of the 
nominal standard of money arises from the confusion of the standard of price with the 
means of circulation. 2) Marx is right to stress the Lowndesian face of Locke and the Lockean face 
of Lowndes. On the whole, in the debate, one can find not only two conception of the 
value of money, as in the standard literature, but, at least, three: 1) the value of coins is 
determined by the quantity of silver contained in them; 2) the value of coins is 
determined by the value of the silver contained in them and 3) the value of coins is 
determined by the names stamped upon them. For all I have seen in this debate, I would 
lend my support to the first conception. 
3) Marx’ contribution is extremely helpful to clear the political positions in the 
debate; he makes the picture much clearer and thereby helps to discern the theoretical 
arguments at stake, separated from the practical interests of the parties. There are 
references to Locke in the standard literature as a defender of “monetary stability”. I 
have shown that those references need a good deal of qualification. 
4 ) Steuart is right in criticizing the thesis of Locke that, in case of debasement, 
the wealth lost by the creditors is not redirected to the debtors, but to the holders of 
heavy coins. The only way to justify this is to hold that a debasement does not trigger 
an equivalent inflation, but this is a thesis that Locke explicitly denies. 
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